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Simonides’ well known Ode to Scopas, which Plato introduces in the Protagoras, provides fertile 
ground for a discussion of two different forms of human goodness: on the one hand, the excellence 
embodied by the perfectly good man (τετράγωνος ἀνήρ); on the other hand, a less perfect form 
of goodness, which is the one embodied by the “healthy man” (ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ). This essay will 
critically address the shift from perfect to imperfect goodness and its underlying reasons. More 
specifically, I will argue that the distinctive goodness of the “healthy man” can be identified with 
a form of “minimal political decency”. As such, this can be praised only in comparison to a 
condition of lawlessness.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Simonides, born in Kea island from an aristocratic family, lived approximately 
between 556 and 468 a.C. He is generally hailed as one of the most successful 
representatives of choral lyric poetry, a literary trend whose span runs from the poet 
Alcman in the archaic period (7th century B.C.) – to Timotheos in the classical period 
(beginning of 4th century). His Ode (or Encomium1) to Scopas, which Plato introduces as 
                                                          
1 The above mentioned piece was widely known as an “encomium” (Starting from Gentili, Bruno. 
“Studi su Simonide.” Maia 16(1964), pp. 278–304: 295-296). Being a well-established form of 
poetic composition in Greek Archaic age, the encomium was generally used to commemorate 
noble deeds. As such, it could serve not only as the repository of the society’s record of its past, 
but also as a “storehouse” of information concerning the ethical principles in force in Greek 
society (see Segal, Charles P. “Song, Ritual, and Commemoration in Early Greek Poetry and 
Tragedy.” Oral Tradition 4, 3(1989): 330-359). Only a few scholars have expressed reservation 
about the classification of the Simonidean poem as an encomium. See for instance Bowra (Bowra, 
Cecil M. “Simonides and Scopas.” Classical Philology 29(1934): 230-239), who considers it to 
be a skolion, i.e. as one sung by invited guests at banquets (cf. Dickie, M. “The Argument and 
Form of Simonides 542 PMG.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 82(1978), pp. 21-33: 21-
22, who takes it as an occasional poem composed to be performed as an encomium at a banquet). 
See also Parry (Parry, Hugh. “An Interpretation of Simonides 4 (Diehl)”, Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 96(1965), pp. 297-320: 298-299), who does not deny that the 
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the subject of several exegetic attempts in Plato’s Protagoras, provides valuable 
philosophical insights into two of the possible forms that human goodness can assume. 
The first consists in the image of a perfectly good man (ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ), square 
(τετράγωνος) in hands and feet and mind, constructed without a flaw2 (Fr. 542.1-3 PMG; 
Fr. 4 Diehl; cf. Plato, Prot. 339b1-3; 344a2-3). The second  is the image of a “healthy” 
man (ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ), who is good enough simply as long as he is not bad or too lawless3 
and knows polis-benefiting justice (542.34-36 PMG; cf. Plato, Prot. 346c2-9). The typical 
behaviour of the “healthy man”, consisting in sheer abstinence from injustice, departs 
from the one exhibited by the so-called “four-squared” man, who embodies human 
goodness at its finest. More specifically, while the first image stresses the highest 
conceivable peak of human excellence, the second denotes a less demanding degree of 
goodness. 
 The present essay aims not only to pinpoint the shift from Simonides’ account of 
perfect goodness to the second, less perfect ethical ideal emphasized in the poem and its 
underlying reasons, but also to inquire into the Socratic employment of the two 
Simonidean accounts and the message/s he means to convey by way of his exegetic 
analysis. I will propose that Socrates does not mean so much to praise one ideal at the 
expenses of the other as to present two different ways of speaking of moral goodness. In 
Socrates’ view, the morally perfect man and the “healthy” man may represent respectively 
the highest and the lowest level of moral goodness which a man can ideally embody 
across his life. Within such a theoretical framework,        
(a) perfect virtue is presented as something which is possible to acquire, despite the costs and 
efforts involved in its acquisition. 
                                                          
poem might contain a praise of Scopas but advances the possibility that the poem is a “consolatory 
piece”.  
2 In this paper I shall adopt a slightly modified version of the Arieti’s and Barrus’ translation 
(Arieti, James A. and Barrus, Roger M. (eds.) Plato’s Protagoras (Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers 2010), p. 97), from which all the passages of the Protagoras quoted in this essay will 
be taken, unless differently specified. The edition of the Greek text I employ is by Denyer (Denyer 
Nicholas (ed. By). (2008) Plato. Protagoras (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
3 In this paper I shall replace Arieti’s and Barrus’ translation of “ἀπάλαμνος” as “inept” with 
Lamb’s translation “lawless” (see Lamb, Walter Rangeley Maitland, ed. by Protagoras, in Plato. 
Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3 (London: William Heinemann Ltd 1967)). 
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(b) the virtue of the “healthy” man can be thought of not only as a moral attitude, but also as 
distinctively political virtue, one identifiable as a form of “minimal political decency”. As such, 
this can be praised only in comparison to a condition of lawlessness.  
In the first part I supply some information about the structure of the Simonidean 
poem and attempt a reconstruction of the theoretical image of the perfectly virtuous man 
and its distinctive features. My investigation will address both the original verses of the 
first two strophes of the poem and some of the relative exegetical remarks advanced by 
Socrates in the Protagoras. In the second part of the essay I will argue that the paradigm 
of “imperfect moral goodness” expresses a virtual threshold of human political agency, 
namely one below which a person cannot either be praised or regarded as “good”. I hope 
to show that, by availing himself of the two Simonidean images of human goodness, 
Socrates lays the ground for an anthropology of virtue bounded by a maximum and a 
minimum degree of goodness, and also that he does so without distorting Simonides’ 
message. I will propose that the ultimate intention of the Platonic Socrates in using 
Simonides’ poem is to offer further articulation and clarity to the Protagorean idea of a 
“minimum sense of justice” that can be derived from a reading of Prot. 320c6-328d1. 
This minimum level of virtue, if not supported by an adequate education, cannot accepted 
by Socrates as a commendable ideal.  
 
2. The poem: text and structure 
 
 Before undertaking the tasks proposed in this essay, some words about the 
structure of the poem are in order. It is generally agreed that the Ode to Scopas has come 
down to us incomplete4, so that it must be classed as a large fragment rather than a whole 
poem.5 The traditional strophic arrangement of the Ode is the one proposed by those 
editors (like Diehl, Page, Aars, and Edmonds) who have preserved the same order of 
quotation of the verses contained in Plato’s Protagoras. On the reconstruction of the 
poem proposed in the collection of Greek lyric poems Poetae Melici Graeci (edited by 
                                                          
4 Woodbury (Woodbury, Leonard. “Simonides on Arete.” Transaction and Proceedings of the 
American Philological Association 84(1953), pp. 135-163: 139) suggests that the poem “was well 
known in the fifth century, but not wholly preserved because it was too well known to quote in 
full”.   
5 See Parry 1965: 297.  
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Page; PMG 542), its verses fall into four stanzas, the first of which is taken to lack seven 
lines.6 The arrangement proposed in PMG 542 (the most widely accepted by scholars, 
which I shall adopt myself in the present essay) is the following:  
[T]o become a good man truly 
is difficult, in hands and feet and mind 
square, fashioned without fault; 
[seven verses are missing] 
nor to me is the Pittacus-thing harmoniously 
circulated, although said by a wise man;  
he said that it is difficult to be noble. 
A god alone would have this gift. It is 
not possible for a man not to be bad, 
[a man] whom intractable disaster takes down; 
Faring well, every man is good,  
but bad if [faring] badly, 
and for the most part best [are the men] 
whom the gods love. 
 
Therefore not ever shall I, searching for 
what cannot come into being,  
toss a share of my life 
onto an empty impractical hope, 
[the hope of] an entirely blameless man, among all of us 
who reap the solidly founded earth. 
But if I should find him I’ll let you know.  
But I praise and love all, 
whoever willingly does 
nothing ugly; and not even do the gods 
fight with necessity. 
I am not a lover of blame. For me it is fitting  
that a man not be wicked nor completely lawless, [a man] 
understanding justice [a thing] useful to the state, 
a healthy man; and him I 
shall not blame; you see, [there are] generations 
of numberless fools;  
all things are fair, [the things] with which 
ugly things are not mixed7. 
 
ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι  
                                                          
6 As Giuliano (Giuliano, F.M. “Esegesi letteraria in Platone: la discussione sul carme simonideo 
nel Protagora.” 41(1992), pp. 105-190: 114, footnote 32) explains by quoting Wilamowitz-
Mollendorf, Christ, Parry and Schwenk, the lacuna identifiable in the verses 4-10, as well as the 
one in verses 31-2 of the Page edition, might not have illustrated anything relevant in terms of 
content.  
7 Translation by Arieti and Barrus in Appendix C (Arieti and Barrus 2010: 119-120). I replace 
“shameful” with “ugly”. The reasons for my choice are briefly explained in footnote 45 of this 
paper. 
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5 
χαλεπόν χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ 
τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον· 
    [ 
5  [ 
    [ 
    [ 
    [ 
    [ 
10[ 
    _ 
 
οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον 
νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰ- 
ρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ᾽ ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.  
θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοι γέρας, ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐκ 
15        ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, 
ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ· 
πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, 
κακὸς δ᾽ εἰ κακῶς [ 
[ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν 
20 [οὕς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.] 
__ 
τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι 
δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ- 
πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω, 
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι 
25  καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός· 
ἐπί θ᾽ ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω. 
πάντας δ᾽ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω, 
ἑκὼν ὅστις ἕρδῃ 
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν: ἀνάγκαι  
30 δ᾽ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται. 
[ 
[ 
[οὐκ εἰμὶ φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγ᾽ ἐξαρκεῖ 
ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾖ] μηδ᾽ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰ- 
35 δώς γ᾽ ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν, 
ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ: οὔ †μὴν† ἐγὼ 
μωμήσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων 
ἀπείρων γενέθλα. 
πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσίν 
40 τ᾽ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται. 
Only a few scholars propose alternative arrangements of the Simonidean verses. 
Beresford, for instance, hypothesizes that the poem falls in three stanzas instead of four, 
and argues that the seven lines of the first stanza of the poem traditionally regarded as 
missing are verses 10-14 of strophe 2 of the PMG edition, whereas verses 24-28 would 
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6 
fall in strophe 2.8 Others, instead, believe that the section of the song corresponding to 
PMG 542.33–40 constitutes an epode, that is, the conclusive strophe of a triad (the other 
strophes being the thesis and the antithesis).9 Among them, Gentili suggests that only a 
very short part of Simonides’ poem is mentioned in Plato’s Protagoras, so that the whole 
first triad would be omitted, with the exception of the 3 initial verses of the first strophe. 
As he believes, PMG 542.33–40 would be the epod of the second triad of the poem, which 
expresses an ideal of goodness antitethical to the one of perfect virtue supposedly 
illustrated in the first one.10 The possibility that the poem be originally longer than the 
stanzas into which it is generally credited to fall, however, is not entirely credible, 
especially if we consider that in Protagoras 344b3 Socrates proposes to investigate the 
poem’s general outline and intent – a declaration of purpose which might imply that at 
least part of every stanza is going to be included in his exegetic analysis.11  
As far as the purpose of the poem is concerned, the issue has sparked scholarly 
controversy in several aspects. While some readers believe that the human ideal of the 
“imperfect”, “healthy” man is the primary object of Simonides’ praise12, others maintain 
                                                          
8 See Beresford (Beresford, Adam, “Nobody’s Perfect: A New Text and Interpretation of 
Simonides PMG 542.” Classical Philology 103,3(2008): 237-256. More details of his 
reconstruction will be supplied in footnote 26 of this paper).  
9 For a detailed discussion and criticism of this view see Giuliano 1992: 113-114, footnote 32.  
10 See Gentili 1964, especially 288. 
11 See Parry 1965: 316. 
12 As it has been suggested by Carson (Carson, Anne. “How Not to Read a Poem: Unmixing 
Simonides from ‘Protagoras’.” Classical Philology 87,2(1992): 110-130), the main intention of 
the poem is not to offer a simple description of virtue and its forms, but to praise one of those 
forms, namely the less demanding form of moral goodness. See for instance Adam and Adam 
(Adam, James and Adam, Adele M. Platonis Protagoras. With Introduction, Notes and 
Appendices. Cambridge University Press 1893), who speak of “the easy-going morality of the 
poem”. Cf. Smyth (Smyth, Herbert.Weir. Greek Melic Poets (Macmillan and co 1900), pp. 311-
312). Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. Sappho und Simonides: 
Untersuchungen über griechische Lyriker (Weidmann 1913), pp. 175-176) maintains that 
Simonides describes an older aristocratic ideal in the first strophe of his poem, which he replaces 
with a new, more “ethical” one (this aspect of his view is highlighted by Beresford 2008: 238, 
footnote 3). See also Donlan (Donlan, Walter. “Simonides, Fragment 4D and P. Oxy. 2432.” 
Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 100(1969), pp. 71–95: 
75-87), who agrees that Simonides is attacking the aristocratic ideal of virtue, although believing 
that in the first strophe the poet is referring to the newer (political) ideal, not to the aristocratic 
one. Cf. Bowra (1934: 235-239), who contends not only that Simonides means to praise the virtue 
of the “healthy man”, but also that the nature of that virtue is eminently political. Beresford, 
instead, considers the Simonidean poem as an invitation to pursue the ethical life of a “healthy” 
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7 
that the poet’s first and most authentic concern is for the image of the man of outstanding 
excellence outlined in the first two strophes.13 In principle, this type of man is not 
impossible to find in real life (consider for instance the verse “if I find one [i.e. a 
permanently virtuous man in the perfect sense] I will let you know” in PMG 542.26), and 
it is not to be excluded that Simonides himself intends to endorse the image of a morally 
faultless man as a normative paradigm of attainable virtuous agency to which it is worth 
sticking. 
 On the other hand, it is undeniable that the he appears committed to stressing 
some difficulties related to the achievement of such a perfect ideal, as well as the 
impossibility to preserve perfect virtue across a lifespan when severely bad circumstances 
befall a good man. As a matter of fact, Simonides throws into sharp relief the benefits of 
a modest, less demanding ideal of virtue, and in the Ode he unequivocally presents the 
goodness proper to the man neither too wicked nor inept, i.e. the “healthy” (ὑγιής) man, 
as a more practicable option than the one of perfect excellence embodied by the “square” 
man “in hands, feet, and mind”.  
The attention paid by the poet to the morally imperfect man is likely to be justified 
by the occasion and the reasons for the composition of the poem. Being probably written 
around 513-510 b.C.14, the Ode was addressed to Scopas, son of the Thessalian king 
Creon, a man outstanding in power and wealth and yearning for celebration.15 Although 
the aims of the poem remain dubious, some scholars have suggested that Simonides’ 
insistence on the difficulty of being perfectly good represents a warning for the king not 
                                                          
man as a more practicable ideal than one of perfect excellence, without entailing that the “less 
demanding virtue” is of political nature (2008).  
13 See Dickie (1978: 23–26), according to whom Simonides endorses the older aristocratic 
standard, although admitting that it is too difficult to attain. A similar view is held by Woodbury 
(1953: 153). See also Frede (Frede, Dorothea. “The Impossibility of Perfection: Socrates’ 
Criticism of Simonides’ Poem in the Protagoras.” 39, 4(1986), pp. 729-753: 738), who says that 
Simonides, although stressing the idea that human virtue is imperfect if compared to the one of 
the gods (a traditional topic that can be traced to Homer), supports a certain re-evaluation of old 
values. As Frede points out, not only does Simonides suggest that goodness depends on external 
conditions of fortune, but also proposes that the inner attitude determines the worth of a person.  
14 On the issue of the date of composition of the poem I refer the reader to Johnston, Richard W. 
and Mulroy, David D. “Simonides’ Use of the Term ΤΕΤΡΑΓΩΝΟΣ.” Arethusa 37, 1(2004), pp. 
1-10: 2, footnote 3. 
15 On Scopas’ desire for honour and his request to Simonides see Cicero, De Oratore 2.86.352.  
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8 
to be too self-demanding in terms of general ethical conduct16, whereas others have 
proposed that the poet endeavours to free Scopas from an accusation of specific acts of 
injustice17, or simply to console him for his lack of perfect virtue.18 Given the political 
role held by Scopas, it has even been suggested that the poet aims to supply him with an 
ethical code that may excuse a persistent policy of oppression.19  
A different question is the purpose for which the Platonic Socrates employs his 
verses. Does Socrates’ apparent insistence on the figure of the healthy man betray a sheer 
willingness to give his interlocutors a display of his hexegetic ability? Alternatively, 
should we suppose that Socrates himself means to underscore two different ways of 
understanding human goodness? If that is the case, what practical relevance of each model 
of goodness does he present? As I believe, Socrates might appeal to Simonides’ poem 
mainly as a suitable basis for discussion on political virtue within a democratic framework 
– one which admits of various levels of human goodness and finds its starting point in a 
minimal degree of moral and civic decency. As I hope it will emerge in the last section 
of this essay, I hope to articulate the view that, when it comes to decency (understood as 
a minimal level of civic goodness), Simonides’ appeal to it might be used by Socrates to 
better articulate Protagoras’view of virtue as a good in which every citizen (although to 
different degrees) takes part.  
 
3. Understanding the poem within the Platonic Philosophical Framework 
  
 Before undertaking a critical discussion of the two ideals of goodness sketched 
out by Simonides in his Ode to Scopas, a few words on the context in which Plato places 
the Simonidean fragments are needed. In the central section of the Protagoras, Socrates 
                                                          
16 See for instance Snell 1961: 52. See also Buongiovanni 1998, who argues that both the image 
of perfect virtue (which is difficult, but not impossible to achieve) and the one of the healthy man 
are meant to highlight the value of the tyrant Scopas, both in fortunate and in less fortunate 
circumstances. The author claims that this approach is in line with the literary tradition of Archaic 
choral lyric poetry (e.g. Pyndar and Bacchilides).   
17 See Schneidewin, Friederich W. Simonides Cei Carminum Reliquiae (Vieweg and Son 1885), 
pp. 21-22. 
18 See Parry (1965: 298, 310), who points out that the consolatory tone of the poem might have 
been sparked by a specific (although unknown) occasion. See also Frede 1986: 738. 
19 See Smyth 1900, pp. 311-312. 
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9 
and the sophist Protagoras confront each other on the issue of the teachability of virtue 
by way of critical exegesis of the poetic composition at issue. The initiative to engage in 
interpretation of poetic verses is undertaken by Protagoras, who openly admits being a 
teacher of virtue (Prot. 316c5-d3; 317b2-5; 318a5-8) and professes himself to be strongly 
convinced that a man’s education, in its greatest part, consists in being skilled in the 
matter of poetic verses (Prot. 338e7-8). Having illustrated the main tenets of Simonides’ 
poem, Protagoras expects Socrates to agree that a logical inconsistency occurs between 
two strophes. In the first strophe (Prot. 339b1-320) we read that  
[O]n the one hand, for a man to become good truly is difficult, 
Square in hands and feet and mind, constructed without a flaw.21 
[ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι  
χαλεπόν χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ 
τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον·] (cf. PMG 542.1-3). 
 In the second strophe (Prot. 339c3-5) Simonides addresses a saying of Pittacus of 
Mytilene, an aristocratic statesman and military commander better known as one of the 
Seven Wise Men of ancient Greece (and equally famous for being an enemy of tyranny).22 
Disagreeing with his views, Simonides says: 
[N]or for me is the Pittacus-view harmoniously circulated, although said by a wise man - he said 
that being noble is difficult. 
[οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον 
νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰ- 
ρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ᾽ ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.] (cf. PMG 542.11-13). 
 Socrates is asked to take part in the conversation by answering the following 
question: how can Simonides claim that it is indeed hard to become a perfectly good man 
and, all the same, criticize Pittacus for expressing the same view without contradicting 
himself? In order to give the poem logical consistency – to the effect of offering equally 
reasonable exegetical solutions – Socrates proposes three tentative readings. Initially, 
Socrates asks for the virtual help of Simonides’ well-known fellow-citizen Prodicus of 
                                                          
20 Cfr. fragment 37 Diehl.  
21 Unless differently specified, translation used in this paper is by Arieti and Barrus (2010).  
22 The informations above are taken from Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent 
Philosophers I, 74-81. Regarding Pittacus’ adversion for tyranny, in I, 74 the author reports that 
Pittacus, aided by the brothers of Alcaeus, Pittacus, overthrew Melanchrus, tyrant of Lesbos.  
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Ceos, who lived between 465 BC and 395BC (340a7-8). As Socrates believes, Protagoras 
has failed to realize that there is a neat semantic difference between the “γενέσθαι 
ἀγαθόν” (becoming good) of the first strophe and the “ἔμμεναι23 ἐσθλός” (being good) of 
the second one. It is at Prot. 340c3-d1 that Socrates explains the apparent discrepancy 
between the two strophes away:  
[P]ittacus was not saying that it was difficult to become noble, as Simonides was saying, but to 
be [noble]; and these are not the same, Protagoras, as our Prodicus here says — to be and to 
become. And unless to be and to become are the same thing, Simonides himself is not saying 
things opposite to himself. 
 Socrates suggests that the two strophes would contradict each other only if 
Simonides claimed that being a good man is a difficult task. This, however, is not the 
case. As Socrates maintains, while being a good man is for Simonides an easy task, 
becoming a good man is not.  
In support of his view, Socrates quotes the poet Hesiod:  
[A]nd perhaps our Prodicus here and many others would say, in accordance with Hesiod, that to 
become good is difficult,‘that before excellence the gods have put sweat,’ but when [someone] 
has come to the height [of excellence], then it is easy to be there, though it was difficult [before] 
[Hesiod, Works and Days 289; cf. Plato, Republic 364c5-d3] (Prot. 340d1-4). 
Whether Socrates’ exegesis is to be taken seriously or not24, several plausible 
reasons for excluding that Simonides is contradicting himself in the poem have been 
advanced in the relevant secondary literature. A possible solution is expressed by 
Schütrumpf in his Simonides 542 PMG. Schütrumpf maintains that – pace Socrates – no 
real distinction between “being” and “becoming” virtuous is drawn in the Simonidean 
poem. Schütrumpf argues that, in the first strophe, Simonides is simply providing a 
preliminary and revisable opinion on virtue – presumably the highest and most perfect 
virtue – whereas in the second strophe he simply changes his view and stresses that, after 
careful consideration, being virtuous appears to be not just difficult, but really impossible, 
                                                          
23 Epic form of εἶναι. 
24 According to some, the distinction between “becoming good” and “being good” might have 
been introduced in the Protagoras either as a “play” (see Gundert 1952: 71 and von Wilamowits-
Mollendorf 1913, p. 47 quoted by Giuliano 1992: 106, footnote 4) or a “parody” (see Taylor, 
Christopher C.W. (translated with notes). Plato, Protagoras, (Oxford University Press 1976, p. 
145). Both cases would exclude the possibility of involuntary exegetical mistakes on Plato’s part.  
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11 
given the plethora of unforeseeable, negative events which generally turn a good man into 
a reprehensible one. Being permanently virtuous, then, would be an exclusive prerogative 
of god.  
An alternative solution is proposed by Beresford (already mentioned in section 2 
of this paper) in his essay Nobody’s perfect. Like Schütrumpf, Beresford contends that no 
distinction is drawn between “being” and “becoming” virtuous in the Ode to Scopas, and 
he suggests that it the only object of Simonides’ concern is “being permanently 
virtuous”.25 Unlike Schütrumpf, though, Beresford considers the Pittachean being 
“ἐσθλός” of the second strophe as a less demanding form of goodness than the one 
represented by the “ἀγαθός” man of the first strophe. By saying in the first strophe that to 
be virtuous in the perfect sense is “difficult”, Simonides would actually mean that it is 
“impossible”. By contrast, through the disagreement with Pittacus expressed in the 
second strophe, he would imply that being virtuous in a less perfect sense is neither 
difficult nor impossible, but easy. That is the reason why the virtue of the ἐσθλός man, 
unlike the one embodied by the τετράγωνος man, would be achievable.  
In my opinion, both interpretations elicit substantial problems. In the first place, 
none of them takes seriously the idea that the difference between “becoming” 
(“γενέσθαι”) and “being” (“ἔμμεναι”) was already deep seated in Simonides’ culture26, 
                                                          
25 It is precisely this view that prompts Beresford to suggest an alternative arrangement of the 
verses of the Simonidean poem (as shown already in section 2 of the present paper) and to deny 
that seven lines of the poem are missing in the first strophe. Beresford’s alternative arrangement 
is therefore the following: «For a man it’s certainly hard to be truly good—perfect in hands, feet, 
and mind, built without a single ﬂaw; only a god can have that prize; but a man, there’s no way 
he can help being bad when some crisis that he cannot deal with takes him down. Any man’s good 
when he’s doing well in life, bad when he’s doing badly, and the best of us are those the gods love 
most. But for me that saying of Pittacus doesn’t quite ring true (even though he was a smart man): 
he says “being good is hard”; for me, a man’s good enough as long as he’s not too lawless, and 
has the sense of right that does cities good; a solid guy. I won’t ﬁnd fault with a man like that. 
After all, isn’t there a limitless supply of fools? The way I see it, if there’s no great shame in it, 
all’s fair». 
26 As Giuliano says (1992: 143), ancient Greek literature offers several evidences of a semantic 
distinction between “being” and “becoming”. By way of example, he reports a passage of 
Aristophanes’ Frogs (vv. 1187ff.) in which the tragic poet Aeschylus reproaches Euripides for 
inappropriately using the verb “γενέσθαι” instead of “εἶναι”26. Also, in a Scholium to Iliad VI, 98 
it is written that Homer, in having Helenus claim that Diomedes became the mightiest of the 
Acheans, was right in using the verb “γενέσθαι” instead of “εἶναι”26. As Giuliano explains (1992: 
143), scholars like Woodbury (1953: 55, footnote 44) and Parry (1965: 307) have hypothesized 
that the verb “γενέσθαι” was employed by Greek poets to denote the active display of virtue 
throughout difficulties, mostly in the military sphere)26, unlike “ἔμμεναι” which would denote a 
static possession of virtue as well as an “unactualized” disposition. It ought to be noted, however, 
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12 
and the possibility that Simonides himself might have appealed to that distinction so as 
to stress two different aspects of goodness, namely achievement and preservation of it27. 
If that is the case, the Platonic Socrates might have been right in (unironically) detecting 
a distinction between “γενέσθαι” and “ἔμμεναι” in Simonides’ verses. This possibility is 
suggested by the fact that, aiming to interpret and even to rehabilitate28 Simonides, he 
resorts to the linguistic skills of Prodicus, a well-known expert in terminological analysis 
who, albeit being generally ranked among the most illustrious representatives of the 
sophistic movement, seems to be treated by Socrates himself with the respect typically 
due and the credibility given to friends.29 In the second place, nowhere in the dialogue 
does Socrates suggest that the adjective “ἀγαθός” of the first strophe and the “ἐσθλός”30 
of the second express two different forms of goodness – not to mention the fact that the 
adjective “ἐσθλός” is generally employed in lyric poetry to indicate a supremely high 
virtue rather than an imperfect, less demanding degree of excellence. It is generally agreed 
that, by the end of the sixth century b.C., the word “ἐσθλός” had become a political label 
assumed by aristocrats (especially by aristocratic poets such as Theognis and Pindar) in 
their struggle against the populace – more specifically, against those who, in the attempt 
to overthrow aristocratic leaders, considered themselves “excellent” simply on the basis 
of possession of wealth and political offices.31 At the time of Simonides, then, the 
adjective “ἐσθλός” (similarly to “ἀγαθός”) had ended up denoting a virtue based on moral 
                                                          
that nothing hinders “ἔμμεναι” from meaning in some contexts “γενέσθαι”. See for instance line 
15 of the Simonidean poem, which says that it is not possible for a man not to turn bad (ἔμμεναι) 
whenever intractable disasters occur.  
27 See Woodbury 1953: 150; cf. Frede 1986: 741. For a detailed list of scholars who believe that 
Simonides is really interested in establishing a difference between “being” and “becoming” 
(although grounding that difference in assumptions different from from the ones implied by the 
Platonic Socrates), see Giuliano 1992: 141, footnote 139. 
28 As Socrates himself admits at Prot. 340a7, the reading he proposes is an ἐπανόρθωμα, that is 
to say, a “correction” of Simonides’ views. The word “ἐπανόρθωμα” is also used at Prot. 340d6, 
when he criticises Socrates for saying that his correction of Simonides implies that virtue is an 
easy thing to possess.  
29 See for instance Plato, Hippias Major 282c, where Socrates calls Prodicus his “friend” 
(ἑταῖρος). 
30 The adjective “ἐσθλός” is introduced in Plato’s Protagoras as part of a saying of Pittacus 
(340c5; cf. 344d6, and 344e3).  
31 See Bowra (1934: 233). 
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desert.32 Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that Plato does not consider “ἀγαθός” 
and “ἐσθλός” to be interchangeable, even more so if we consider that the real distinction 
which Simonides means to emphasize in the poem is the one between a perfectly good 
man (embodied in the image of the “τετράγωνος ἀνήρ”) and the more practicable ideal of 
imperfect moral goodness embodied by the “healthy” man (ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ) of the final part 
of the poem. Indeed, there is no strong evidence in the poem which might prompt us to 
maintain that already in the second strophe Simonides is foreshadowing the ideal of 
“moral health” worked out in the last strophe. The interpretation I support is the 
following: Simonides believes that perfect virtue is difficult, but not impossible to 
achieve. What is truly impossible, instead, is to preserve a stable, perfect virtue whenever 
a severely bad luck befalls a virtuous man. It is recognition of this fact which leads the 
poet to show appreciation for a less demanding ideal, one the attainment of which does 
not present the same degree of difficulty and implies an inferior amount of vain efforts.  
 
4. The tetragōnos man  
 
The idea of a supremely high virtue is vividly emphasized through the 
metaphorical33 image of the man “τετράγωνος in hands and feet” and “in mind” (see the 
datives of relation χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ, and νόῳ). Such specifications resonate with 
conventional ideas and images (visual as well as literary) well-known in his time. The 
combination of the excellences of hands and feet, for instance, indicates in Pindar the 
featuring trait of either victorious athletes (Pyth. x. 23, 
χερσὶν ἢ ποδῶν ἀρετᾷ κρατήσαις) or heroes such as Erginus (Ol. iv. 24-25) and Achilles 
(Isthm. viii. 37). Also, the combination of “head” and “hand” appears in Pindar’s 
descriptions of ideal manhood, which is embodied by men like Aiakos (Nem. viii. 8)34, as 
well as in Timocreon, who, speaks of an unnamed man (possibly Themistocles) 
outshining for excellence in hands and mind.35 This conjunction of talents underpins the 
                                                          
32 See Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1913: 159-191, Woodbury 1953: 152, and Donlan 1969: 74. 
33 Aristotle himself says that the image of the four-square man is metaphorical in Rhet. III, 
11.1411b27.  
34 See Bowra 1934: 231-232. 
35 PMG 727; Plutarch, Life of Themistocles 21; Bowra 1934: 231. Goold (Goold, George P. Greek 
Lyric, Vol. IV (Harvard University Press 1992), p. 85) reports the content of Sud. T 625 (iv 558 
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archaic notion of ἀρετή, which is mainly associated to outstanding military 
performances.36  
Noticeably, Simonides does not make any special reference to warlike virtue in 
the Ode to Scopas. This appears reasonable if we assume that his goal is to sketch out a 
comparison between the image of the supremely virtuous man and the more accessible 
(and therefore practicably recommendable) one of the healthy man, who is simply 
respectful of laws and refrains from harming people. In other words, the distinction 
between the two forms of goodness will be plausibly established in relation to a shared 
ground for assessment, not in the light of respectively different fields of action, such as a 
military and a properly “civic” one. In that case, the distinction at stake could simply refer 
to different levels of ethical perfection supposedly attainable in a given (and the same) 
situation. Simonides’ image of the τετράγωνος man seems to indicate an all-embracing 
virtue, one which extends over and above mere courage in the battlefield and involves the 
capacity to display various forms of goodness in a wide variety of circumstances. 
Although Simonides does not straightforwardly explain the meaning of the adjective 
“τετράγωνος”, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he is referring to the “rigid” and 
“incorruptible” nature of those who possess a stable disposition of character, especially 
with regard to their capacity to resist difficulties in a variety of contingent circumstances. 
This is for instance how Aristotle employs the same adjective to qualify the good man in 
absolute in the Nicomachean Ethics. As he says in NE I, 10.1100b19-22, a virtuous man 
will engage in action and contemplation in accordance with virtue and   
will bear changes of fortunes in the fairest manner (κάλλιστα) and quite suitably in every regard 
(πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς) insofar as he is truly good (ἀληθῶς ἀγαθός) and square without flaw 
(τετράγωνος).37 
We should not exclude that, just like the Aristotelian virtuous man, who on various 
occasions is deemed to be a measure and a criterion of evaluation of perfect human 
                                                          
Adler). As we learn from it, Timocreon, was a Rhodian and also a playwright of the Old Comedy: 
«[H]e was at loggerheads with Simonides, the lyric poet, and with Themistocles the Athenian, 
against whom he composed a poem of censure in lyric metre. He wrote a comedy on the same 
Themistocles and the lyric poet Simonides in addition to other words».  
36 Cf. Vegetti, Mario. L’etica degli antichi (Laterza 1989), ch. 2.  
37 I adopt Johnston and Mulroy’s translation of the passage (2004).  
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15 
agency38, the Simonidean τετράγωνος man turns out to be a regulative model for excellent 
behaviour. As Johnston and Mulroy have for instance suggested, Simonides might have 
been inspired by the sphere of visual arts and, more specifically, by the world of archaic 
sculpture.39 The authors explain that tetragonal is for instance the shape of the grids 
employed by sculptors for the moulding of individual works, as well as the works 
themselves which through the grids get shaped. Surprisingly, Johnston and Mulroy 
identify the tetragonal grids as symbols for a model of action foreshadowing imperfect 
goodness, given that such grids were commonly used for the creation of herms – statues 
lacking limbs and generally symbolizing democratic power.40 In my opinion, admitting 
that Johnston and Mulroy are right in proposing that Simonides was really influenced by 
the sphere of sculpture (and I believe they might be right), it is perhaps more reasonable 
to suppose that the tetragonal grids evoke exclusively the idea of perfect goodness, insofar 
as the τετράγωνος man excludes the idea of imperfection and is starkly different from the 
man who is simply “healthy”, but not wicked and lawless.  
In this light, it would be legitimate to use the phrase “truly virtuous” only by 
reference to the level of moral goodness displayed by the τετράγωνος man. This, of 
                                                          
38 See for instance Nicomachean Ethics III, 4.1113a32-34, where Aristotle explains that the good 
person (ὁ σπουδαῖος) behaves differently from the the masses, who judge as “good” something 
which is not, mostly because it is pleasant and it looks like a good: «The good person judges each 
case rightly, and in each case the truth is manifest to him. For each state has its own conception 
of what is noble and pleasant, and one might say that the good person stands out a long way by 
seeing the truth in each case, being a sort of standard and measure of what is noble and pleasant». 
Cf. NE X, 5. 1176a21-23. Tr. Crisp, Roger, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge University 
Press 2000). 
39 See Johnston and Mulroy 2004, especially p. 6. The authors criticize those scholarly views (e.g. 
Smyth (1900), Bowra (1934), and Parry (1965)) contending that the Simonidean τετράγωνος man 
evokes the nature and function of the Pythagorean τετρακτύς, i.e. the geometrical representation 
of the number ‘four’, being a triangle made of ten points arranged in four rows, which played a 
central role in the secret worship of the Pythagoreans. Bowra, in particular (1934: 232), quotes 
the view reported by the Byzantine philosopher Proclus (412–485 AD), who in his comment on 
Euclides’ Elements (Ad Eucl. Elem. 48 G) claims that the ancient Pythagorean notion of the 
number “four”, “τὸ τετράγωνον” was identified as justice (See DK 58B40). As Johnston and 
Mulroy suggest, a problem that this reading elicits is that there is no evidence for the 
dissemination of the details of Pythagorean numerological doctrines at such an early date, 
especially considering that the first extant use of the term “τετρακτύς” occurs only in the writings 
of the Pythagorean Philolaus. This would suggest that Simonides is highly unlikely to have been 
familiar with that doctrine (cf. Cornford, Francis M. (1974). Mysticism and Science in the 
Pythagorean Tradition. In Mourelatos, Alexander P.D., ed. by. The Pre-Socratics: A Collection 
of Critical Essays (Princeton University Press 1974), pp. 135-160: 140, 148). 
40 See Johnston and Mulroy 2004: 6-8. 
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course, would not rule out the existence of people who, although falling short of 
perfection, can be classified as “simply good” and “healthy”. Healthy people, indeed, fail 
to be regarded as authentically virtuous, but it is not for this reason that they ought to be 
considered either vicious or “by-no-means-good”. If the adverb “truly” in verse 1 of the 
poem is to be attached to the adjective “virtuous”, it would indeed contribute to demarcate 
highest goodness from the one possessed by the morally imperfect person. However, we 
should not forget that the issue as to what “truly” qualifies” is a matter of debate. The 
position of “truly” in verse 1 is the following:  
[T]o become a good man truly 
is difficult, in hands and feet and mind 
square, fashioned without fault . 
On Socrates’ reading, Simonides employs “truly” as a qualification of the 
adjective “difficult”, not of the adjective “good”. As he explains by way of a reductio ad 
absurdum, if Simonides meant to say that “becoming a truly good man” is difficult, the 
adverb “truly” would become redundant, in that “good” means already “authentically 
good” (without the need of any further qualification). The Socratic reading appears to be 
premised on the idea that, in order to be reckoned as “good”, a man or a thing must be 
alredy “truly” as such. As it seems to me, the Socratic interpretation of verse is plainly 
ironic. In other words, the Platonic Socrates, although aware of the poet’s real intentions, 
would willingly propose an incorrect reading – either to mock other exegetes of his time, 
who deliberately deceive people, or rather to depart from literal exegesis and take an 
opportunity for expressing a distinctively Socratic(-Platonic) view: namely, the idea that 
we can speak of goodness only with reference to the highest one. Whatever the reasons, 
it is evident that he would not be interested in conveying Simonides’ original message.  
While Socrates denies that Simonides means to place emphasis on the idea of a 
“truly virtuous man”, Aristotle does not. In the already mentioned passage at 
Nicomachean Ethics NE I, 10.1100b19-22, Aristotle resorts to Simonides in support of 
his personal view of the virtuous man by explicitly referring to the one who is “truly 
good” (ἀληθῶς ἀγαθός). The fact remains, however, that Simonides, unlike Aristotle, 
does not take the ἀληθῶς ἀγαθός to express the one and only way of being virtuous. As I 
shall try to argue in the pages that follow, Socrates makes use of Simonides to show that 
even a minimum level of moral goodness can be included in the idea of virtue, and that it 
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is precisely on the threshold between decency and badness that the idea of a “healthy”, 
“not too wicked nor lawfulness” man hinges.  
At any rate, neither form of goodness is necessarily stable. Simonides 
acknowledges the possibility that unexpectedly bad events befall good persons, and he 
seems to place special emphasis on the precarious nature of perfect virtue, which is not 
immune to the strikes of an unmanageable bad luck (although even a “healthy” man could 
in principle become utterly bad41). In Prot. 344c3-4 Socrates quotes the following 
Simonidean verses:  
there’s no way for a man not to be bad (κακός), whom an unmanageable misfortune 
(ἀμήχανος συμφορά) takes down. 
This is not necessarily to say that, at some point in life, a perfectly virtuous man 
must necessarily cope with a series of irresistibly negative events.42 Nevertheless, the poet 
brings to light the fact that, if a severely bad luck occurs, not even the τετράγωνος man 
can preserve his moral and intellectual resources. A reasonable implication of Simonides’ 
use of the adjective “ἀμήχανος” (meaning “irresistible” or “against which nothing can be 
done”) is that only that sort of bad luck –  and not a series of non-extraordinarily bad 
events – has the power to strike the τετράγωνος down and deprive him of his resources. 
It is not a case that Socrates speaks of the skilled person (in technical crafts as well as in 
civic virtue) as “εὐμήχανος”, which is to say, a resourceful human being.43 Simonides 
does not clarify whether a perfect man, once having turned bad due to irresistible bad 
luck, can possibly restore his original virtue. His main concern is rather the fact that not 
even perfect excellence is by itself permanent.  
                                                          
41 See Coby, Patrick. Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment. A Commentary on Plato’s 
Protagoras (Associated University Presses 1987), p. 118. Following the example of doctors, 
Socrates’ reads Simonides as entailing that «only who are good doctors, and better still good 
doctors, can become bad» (my italics).    
42 Cf. Denyer 2008: 161. As the commentator explains, Simonides is aware that some perfectly 
good men are lucky enough to live out their lives without meeting unmanageable disasters, and 
he refers to the sheer possibility that such men are striken by them.  
43 On the semantic contrast between “ἀμήχανος” and “εὐμήχανος” see Coby 1987: 117. Coby also 
explains that ἀμηχανία is not simply inability to be resisted, but also lack of the needed means to 
resist: «Socrates tacitly identifies evil with resourcelessness and being good with 
resourcefulness». In the passage of the Protagoras under examination, resourcefulness is 
presented as the product of technical knowledge. Only an ἀμήχανος συμφορά can overwhelm an 
εὐμήχανος man and leave him ἀμήχανος. 
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5. The imperfectly good man. A preliminary outline 
 
In the first two strophes of the poem, by placing emphasis on the difficulty in 
achieving and the impossibility of preserving perfect virtue in case of an extremely bad 
luck, Simonides sets the basis for the endorsement of a form of virtue which is less 
demanding in quality than the one possessed by the perfect man. Praising an imperfect 
virtue is probably compatible with the idea that the production of lyric works was 
specifically tailored to the needs of individual committees (usually members of 
aristocratic or, more generally, political élites). It ought not to be forgotten that the poem 
under examination was addressed to Scopas, a man outstanding in power and wealth, not 
in virtue. It is highly likely, then, that Simonides’ references to a modest degree of virtue 
are ultimately meant to place bring to the fore the real qualities that Scopas is held to 
possess, rather than pretending to offer lessons on perfect morality. On the one hand, 
Simonides does not mean to present a relatively low degree of virtue as an objectively 
preferable pattern of human conduct over perfect virtue. It is not perhaps a case that he 
introduces the positive aspect of an “imperfect virtue” by qualifying it as the object of his 
personal point of view. That is to say, if he were called to choose between pursuing perfect 
virtue (thus facing the difficulties and the risks entails by this pursuit) and living a more 
modest moral life, he would personally stay content with the benefits stemming from the 
less demanding option. The idea that Simonides is expressing just a subjective preference 
emerges in Protagoras 345c5-10,  
[T]herefore not ever shall I (ἐγώ)44, searching for 
what cannot come into being,  
toss a share of my life 
onto an empty impractical hope, 
[the hope of] an entirely blameless man, among all of us 
who reap the solidly founded earth. 
The verses above suggest that Simonides does not by any means want to “impose” 
imperfect virtue as a pattern of ethical conduct. The employment of the I-form permeates 
the rest of his praise of the moderately virtuous person: 
                                                          
44 All the italics in these verses are mine.  
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But I praise and love all, 
whoever willingly does 
nothing shameful; and not even do the gods 
fight with necessity. 
I am not a lover of blame. For me it is fitting  
that a man not be wicked nor completely lawless, [a man]  
understanding justice [a thing] useful to the state, 
a healthy man; and him I 
shall not blame; you see, [there are] generations 
of numberless fools;  
all things are fair, [the things] with which 
ugly things are not mixed. 
Looking at the strophe above, we may note a glaring omission in Simonides’ 
characterisation of the imperfectly good man: the fact that a particularly bad luck might 
jeopardise not simply the preservation of the highest virtue (whatever this virtue might 
be), but even the maintenance of less perfect virtue (not to mention the idea that bad luck 
might prevent the acquisition of both perfect and imperfect virtue). Although he does not 
make this point explicit, Simonides is probably well aware that even a modest, simply 
“decent” morality is amenable to the same strikes of bad luck which might befall a 
perfectly virtuous person. A possible argument that he might have advanced in regard of 
this thought is that, since bad luck has the power to destroy all prospects of stable 
goodness, it is perhaps worth striving for the kind of goodness which requires less efforts. 
This is not, however, what he says in this strophe. We can hypothesize that, by way of a 
somehow “sophistical” move, he passes off in silence some supposedly negative 
implications of imperfect moral goodness, having preferred to focus in the previous 
strophe on the disadvantages experienced by perfectly virtuous people. Given the 
supposed aim of the poem, he does not seem willing to offer a fair characterisation of the 
positives and negatives of imperfect moral goodness.  
Whether or not Simonides’ argumentative strategies betray sophistic attitudes, 
giving up the search for a blameless person in absolute marks a shift of interest towards 
the imperfectly good man. For in the already mentioned lines we read  
[B]ut I praise and love all, 
whoever willingly does 
nothing ugly; and not even do the gods 
fight with necessity. 
I am not a lover of blame. 
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By claiming “I am not a lover of blame”, the poet implicitly makes room for a 
more inclusive view of moral acceptability, namely one which extends beyond the nature 
and the behaviour of perfectly virtuous men. As we see in line 23-24, by introducing the 
issue of necessity of absolute irreversibility (“not even the gods fight with necessity”), 
Simonides reaffirms in a stronger way the idea (already expressed at vv 8-13) that human 
virtue (not even the highest one) cannot survive against profoundly adverse conditions. 
This might be a good reason to re-evaluate imperfect moral goodness and avoid blaming 
those embodying such a modest ideal. It is worth noticing that Simonides does not 
characterize the figure of the imperfectly good man by situating it somewhere in between 
perfect goodness and utter wickedness. The conceptual image of such a man is outlined 
exclusively with reference to the negative ideal of wickedness:  
For me it is fitting that a man not be wicked nor completely lawless, [a man] ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος.    
As I have already pointed out at footnote 5 of this essay, Arieti and Barrus (on 
whose translation I have relied so far) translate ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος as “too inept”. Generally 
speaking, ineptitude might indicate a lack of moral resources that would make a person 
inadequate to act well and be accounted as good at some level. To say that a person is not 
too inept might mean that the same person possesses either a minimum or an intermediate 
level of moral goodness. As is suggested in the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English 
Lexicon (1996), however, the adjective ἀπάλαμνος is generally employed in archaic lyric 
poetry to denote either a lawless person or a lawless behaviour. If Simonides meant to 
use ἀπάλαμνος in this traditional sense, the concept of lawlessness in his poem would 
perhaps contribute to emphasizing the idea that imperfect moral goodness, contrary to 
total absence of respect for the laws, represents a minimum level of moral decency. it 
seems to me, it is precisely on this minimum level of moral decency and acceptability 
that Simonides aims to put the focus when he describes imperfect moral goodness as a 
more practicable ideal than perfect virtue in absolute. Just to mention a possible reason 
reason why this ought to be so, in verses 31-32 Simonides claims that “beautiful”/“fine” 
(καλός) is for him whatever is not “mixed with ugly45 things” (αἰσχρά). Given his claim 
that he is not a lover of blame, Simonides cannot consider “ugly” any imperfect behaviour 
                                                          
45 I believe that the use the translation “ugly” instead of “shameful” here is particularly fitting in 
the light of Simonides’ aversion toward blame.    
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that can be qualified as close to moral perfection, just as he cannot consider “beautiful” 
or “fair” only those things that express perfect goodness. The image of “beautiful things” 
as “things not mixed with ugly things” conveys not only a modest ideal of moral decency, 
but also one which marks a specific dividing line between “beautiful” and “ugly”. As 
Simonides allows his readers to infer in his verses, those acts from which a good man in 
the imperfect sense refrains are the same that qualify a person as wicked and totally 
lawless. Utterly bad (and therefore justifiably blameable) are not those acts which fail at 
displaying the full-fledged moral potentialities of the τετράγωνος man, but only those 
deeds issuing in neglect of justice and the infringement of the utility of the political 
community, as the verses below suggest:  
it is fitting that a man understands justice as a thing useful to the state [ὀνησίπολιν] (v. 27).  
By ‘wicked’ and ‘lawless’ Simonides seems to indicate a person who fails to 
understand that justice represents a useful resource for the wellbeing of the polis. By using 
the Greek adjective ὀνησίπολιν, Simonides appears to focus on the utility of justice for 
the polis as a whole, not on the utility of each member of a given community by itself. 
Simonides’ reader might be allowed to suppose that the justice useful for the polis might 
reside in those laws (either written or unwritten) promoting order. Presumably, it is 
mainly by way of laws and customs that a city successfully manages to endorse and 
preserve the grounds for a harmonious coexistence between its members. Various forms 
of unlawful behaviour may bring one to commit injustice against one’s fellow/s and, as a 
consequence, to undermine the strength of those ethical principles out of which which a 
certain community derives its identity (which is to say, its constitutive aims and political 
strategies). Regardless of the possible ways in which the preservation of common utility 
occurs (either by written or by unwritten laws or both), inflicting harm on a certain person 
might by extension undermine the credibility (or simply the good functioning) of a 
community which does not take pains of punishing injustice.  
As it is plausible to assume, abstaining from that sort of disrespectful behaviour 
is precisely the attitude that marks a threshold of decency and moral acceptability. 
Abstention, then, would constitute a minimal form of moral goodness, that is, one below 
which no human being could be considered morally good. Equally plausible, in my 
opinion, is the view that the mental state out of which the imperfectly virtuous man 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy                    J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.13, n.2. p. 01-34, 2019. 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP                    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v13i2p01-34 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga 
 
 
 
22 
refuses to perform ugly actions is a distinctive sense of shame, one which, by 
incorporating thoughts about what is to be counted as “morally good behaviour”, fear of 
reprobation46, and a sense of one’s own value as a vulnerable good to protect against bad 
reputation, makes the prospect of committing injustice deeply undesirable.47 A similar 
sense of shame might be the one evoked by the concept of αἰδώς, which in the Protagoras 
the homonymous sophist introduces within the framework of his well-known myth on the 
origin and development of human beings and their distinctive natural faculties (see 
Protagoras 320c7-323a3). In Protagoras’ myth, αἰδώς and δίκη stand out as principles 
which, besides their power to avoid irremediable war and conflict, establish order and 
steady bonds of friendship among human fellows (see Protagoras 322c2-4). The words 
“αἰδώς” and “δίκη” have been variously translated by scholars. Authors like Lamb (1967) 
and Reale (2001) translate “αἰδώς” as “respect”/“rispetto” and δίκη as “right”/“justice”, 
thus implying that the attitude denoted by “αἰδώς” incorporates some sort of reverential 
recognition (or even reverential fear48) of the worth or the authority of the subject(s) 
before which one feels it (either human beings or the laws of the city). Protagoras does 
not explicitly say who or what kind of thing the addressee of “αἰδώς” is. Sauppe and 
Towle (1889), for instance, have suggested that “αἰδώς” is reverence for divine law (δίκη 
meaning reverence for human law), whereas Adam and Adam maintain that “αἰδώς” is 
specifically concerned with fear of the censure that might stem by one’s human fellows.49 
                                                          
46 On the idea of αἰδώς as a part of fear (δέος) see Eutyphro 12c3-6; cf. Laws I, 647a6-b2. 
47 For a comprehensive treatment of the notion of αἰδώς in ancient Greek literature and philosophy 
up to Aristotle’s death see Cairns, Douglas. Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and 
Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, (Oxford University Press 1993). As Cairns explains in the 
introduction of his book (especially at p. 2), in ancient Greek culture, αἰδώς and its verb, αἰδέομαι, 
take on specific connotations, depending on the contexts in which these are employed. Generally 
speaking, however, αἰδώς constitutes an inhibitory emotion rooted on sensitivity to and 
protectiveness of one’s self-image. That emotion, being premised on recognition that one’s self-
image is vulnerable in some way, would lead to virtuous behaviour and to forms of positive 
recognition of the ones who observe and judge that behaviour. This is why αἰδέομαι might be 
translated as “I feel ashamed” before someone but also and especially as “I respect” someone).  
48 Arieti and Barrus put a sense of what is ‘legally just’. 
49 In support of this view, see the use of αἰδώς in Homer, Iliad XV, 561, in which the Telamonian 
Aiax urges his fellow-soldiers to have shame of each other (presumably to refrain from the 
temptation of abandoning the battlefield), Hesiod (Works and Days, 192), who foresees an age of 
corruption in which neither shame nor reciprocal justice will exist, and Plato in Laws I, 647a1-c2 
(cf. footnote 45 above), where the Athenian claims that αἰδώς keeps men together by causing 
them to fear the possibility of censure by their fellows. 
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Like Adam and Adam, I believe that “αἰδώς” in Protagoras’ myth involves mostly (if not 
exclusively) human relationships, especially if we consider that the evil which αἰδώς and 
δίκη are designed to counteract is the destruction of human race at the hands of human 
beings themselves. As it is suggested in the Protagorean myth, the risk of human race 
extinction persists even when human beings, by receiving the gift of fire by Prometheus 
(who stole it from Hephaestus), are given the opportunity to take part in the divine, and 
kinship to deity prompts them to believe in the gods and build altars and images of them 
(Prot. 322a3-6). As it seems, reverence for the gods does not prevent human beings from 
destroying each other. Insofar as Protagoras presents αἰδώς and δίκη as gifts enabling 
human beings to create order and stable bonds of friendships within political 
communities, these principles seem to address primarily cases of lack of respect and 
injustice between human beings, not cases of disrespect of human beings towards divine 
beings.  
Along a similar line, I take δίκη to indicate a personal, basic “sense of justice” 
(and not an impersonal set of rules of behaviour), one by which people are inclined to 
obey the rules of their political community. The αἰδώς and δίκη mentioned in the myth of 
Protagoras are not to be identified with the sense of shame and respect for justice that 
prompts people to perform supererogatory deeds, given that Protagoras simply means to 
highlight their power to promote order and stability, as well as its capacity to ward off 
open conflict in human relationships. The kind of respect for others which cultivation of 
individual sense of shame fosters, then, is simply the one which persons owe to each other 
with a view to avoiding reciprocal harm and encourage human survival. It is precisely in 
virtue of this kind of respect that exercise of a basic level of virtuous inter-relational 
capacity within a certain community can be secured. 
As Protagoras explains after narrating the myth, the Athenians are right in 
believing that each and every member of the political community owns some degree of 
political virtue. A sheer capacity to take part in αἰδώς and δίκη qualifies human beings 
not only as distinctively human, but also as persons capable of acting according to the 
system of justice in force in the city and of giving advices on the management of political 
activity. Protagoras suggests that political virtue (and, as we might legitimately suppose, 
the individual sense of shame) can be trained by means of a targeted education. Although 
not every person receives the same education in the study of poetry, music and 
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gymnastics50, everyone is raised by a family whose members (father, mother, tutor, nurse) 
help him to rectify bad behaviour and to discern the just from the unjust. What is more, 
everyone  is constrained by the city to live according to the laws established by wise 
lawgivers, and to accept those punishments which aim to rectify transgression of them. 
In the light of the mythical narration previously proposed, we might hypothesize that an 
equal access to shared resources for the acquisition of a sense of justice is what qualifies 
human beings as human. As Protagoras will explain after his myth in the attempt to show 
that political virtue is teacheable, different persons will achieve respectively different 
degrees of political virtue depending on their natural talents and the education received.51  
If we are allowed to establish a correspondence between Protagoras’ and 
Simonides’ ideas on imperfect or incomplete virtue, we might hypothesize that untrained 
αἰδώς and δίκη, that is to say, the sense of shame and justice which are not necessarily 
employed as a springboard for higher moral and political achievements, mark a minimum 
degree of moral decency  ̶. the same which Simonides might supposedly work out and 
praise in his ode. A man who refrains from performing evil deeds can be praised insofar 
as he or she willingly chooses to avoid them. It is in this respect that Simonides might be 
right in claiming that  
[B]ut I praise and love all, 
whoever willingly does 
nothing shameful [αἰσχρόν]. 
The idea of willingly refraining from performance of bad actions would exclude 
that minimal justice is an inertial, passive attitude, and justifies the idea that such a form 
of agency can be praised. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the Platonic Socrates 
denies that the adverb “willingly” is to be attached to “doing nothing shameful”, and 
places the phrase “willingly” next to “praise”. The underlying assumption of the Socratic 
                                                          
50 As Protagoras explains at Prot. 326c2-5, the sons of wealthiest people begin school at an earlier 
age than the sons of poorer people, and are freed from it at the latest.  
51 See Prot. 324d2-326e4. The context in which Protagoras justifies his belief is a discussion 
concerning the teachability of virtue. To Socrates, who suggests that virtue is not teachable 
because, if it were so, virtuous politicians would never have vicious or incompetent sons in 
politics, Protagoras replies that this objection is misleading. On his view, failure of good 
politicians to teach political virtue would depend on the politicians’ carelessness for the education 
of their sons, and not on a structural impossiblity to teach virtue. A high degree of political virtue 
could be acquired by anyone having talents and an appropriate education outside the family, 
independently of virtuous parents. 
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exegesis is that, just as nobody does wrong knowingly52, nobody who refrains from bad 
behaviour would do it unwillingly. In which case, in the idea of a voluntary abstention 
from evil would appear pleonastic. The reading proposed by the Platonic Socrates does 
not seem to match the original meaning of Simonides’ verses. Indeed, what the Socratic 
exegesis (if read at a surface level) fails to take into account is the fact that for some 
people to abstain from injustice is the object of painful efforts, and therefore requires a 
self-conscious commitment. 
By way of such an exegetical move, Socrates directs the reader’s attention to the 
possibility that Simonides (contrary to his real inclinations) may willingly force himself 
to accord praise on a lifestyle which is not his own, namely imperfect moral goodness, 
either to the effect of obtaining some material benefits from the addressee of the poem, 
Scopas, or simply with a view to achieving the glory that good poetical activity enables 
one to attain. This Socratic interpretation accords well with the view of a “mercenary 
Simonides”53, who sells himself and show lack of coherence between the values he 
praises in contingent situations (like the composition of a poem with purely encomiastic 
intentions) and the one he truly endorses in his life. However, it would be extremely 
unlikely for the poet to openly express purely encomiastic intentions towards the tyrant 
Scopas, and it is perhaps plausible to assume that this is precisely what Socrates himself 
believes. Therefore, he might deliberately misinterpret Simonides – perhaps in order to 
give a display of exegetic abilities disconnected to the truth, as many sophists do, or 
                                                          
52 See Prot. 358c8-d5: «no one in fact willingly goes toward what’s evil or toward what he thinks 
evil, nor, as is likely, is this [behavior] in human nature - to be willing to go to what one thinks is 
bad instead of good; and when one is constrained to choose one of two evils, no one will choose 
the greater [evil] when it is possible to choose the lesser». 
53 See for instance Plato, Hipparchus 228c2-3, where Socrates explains that Hipparchus induced 
Simonides to be in continual attendance upon him by high pay and valuable presents (cf. 
Barnstone 2010: 118: “Like Anakreon he was one of the poets invited to Athens by Hipparchus 
as part of the program of cultural enrichment inaugurated under the Peisistratid tyranny”). See 
also Aristophanes, Peace 695-701, where Tyrtaeus tells Hermes that Sophocles has turned into 
Simonides, having become so greedy that he would put to sea on a hurdle just to gain an obolus. 
Plutarch (Moralia. Saying of Kings and Commanders 9, Loeb ed.: 91.15e) (see Johnston and 
Mulroy 2004: 2), who claim that “Plutarch (Moralia 15e) preserves the tradition that Simonides 
dumbed his poetry down for the benefit of the whole family of the Skopads, who were relatively 
unsophisticated”). Also, as we learn from Aristotle, Rhet. II, 16.1391a9-12, he praised money 
more than wisdom: «Hence the answer of Simonides to the wife of Hiero concerning the wise and 
the rich, when she asked which was preferable, to be wise or to be rich. ‘Rich,’ he answered, ‘for 
we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the rich’» (tr. Freese, in Freese, John H., ed. 
by and translated. Aristotle. Rhetoric (Harvard University Press 1926)). 
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possibly with a view to finding an opportunity to exhibit authentically Socratic 
assumptions on the involuntariness of evil, or even for both reasons.  
 
6. The Simonidean ideal of ὑγίεια. A basic, incomplete level of virtue. 
 
In verse 36 of the poem, the imperfectly good man is described as “healthy”.54 
The idea of a healthy man seems to lend support to the poet’s willingness to dismiss the 
absolutely perfect man as an exclusive paradigm of moral goodness. According to the 
documentary sources come down to us, Simonides is the first among the thinkers who 
attributed an ethical connotation to the notion of “health”. Insofar as imperfect moral 
goodness is understood as a denial of wickedness, (moral) health will be viewed as 
“absence of (moral) sickness”, rather than as the expression of a well-ordered, excellent 
disposition of character.  
The sense of health as the metaphor for moral goodness appears in several textual 
sources of the 5th-4th century. The orator Isocrates, for instance, considers the “health of 
the soul” to be one of the the best and most desirable goods alongside health of the body 
(Isocrates, 12.7; περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑγιείας). The idea of health of the soul as a 
good worth pursuing (and not simply as a morally acceptable condition) appears also in 
the Platonic dialogues, where the notion at stake denotes a full-fledged good. In several 
of his dialogues, Plato resorts to the concept of physical health (ὑγίεια) in support of his 
attempt to illustrate the human goodness at its fullest, as well as and the character of those 
agents who manage to instantiate it in their lives. To confirm the character of objective 
perfection of such a good, in several occasions health is presented as the product of a 
τέχνη55, that is to say, of a true craft, which makes it different from a simple appearance 
of goodness.56 Plato appears interested in presenting health of the body as a condition of 
                                                          
54 While Arieti and Barrus translate “ὑγιής” as “sound” at Protagoras 346c6, in appendix C they 
use the translation “healthy”. 
55 See Plato, Meno 72d3-e2. Along a similar line, in the Euthydemus health is introduced as the 
“work”, “product” or “effect” (ἔργον) of the medical craft (Euth. 291e4-5). See also the Gorgias 
on the note below. 
56 That possibility is fully explored in the Gorgias, where Socrates compares justice to a healthy 
condition of the soul. Here, health is described as the highest good of the medical craft 
(τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν) (Gorg. 452a4-b1), as a regularity (τάξεσιν; Gorg. 504c5), 
as a body excellence (ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος; Gorg. 504c6), and as a condition which by all means 
excludes disease (cfr. Gorg. 495e5-7, where Socrates explains that one cannot have at the same 
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order created by a technic-scientific knowledge.57 Most crucially, he establishes an 
analogy between health and justice in the soul (that is to say, an excellence, aretē). In the 
IV Book of the Republic, for instance, the Platonic Socrates claims that justice 
(δικαιοσύνη) and injustice (ἀδικία) are in the soul exactly what healthy and diseaseful 
things (τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσωδῶν) are in the body (Rep. IV, 444c1-8). 
Just like health, justice represents a condition of goodness which can be achieved 
throughout an appropriate balancing of hierarchical relationships between qualitatively 
different elements. As the Platonic Socrates states in Rep. 444d3-11,  
“But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating 
and being dominated1 by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or 
is ruled by the other contrary to nature”.  
“Yes, that is so.”  
“And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural 
relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to 
rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature?”  
[οὐκοῦν αὖ, ἔφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ 
κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ᾽ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀδικίαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου]. 
 “Exactly so,” he said.  
                                                          
time ὑγίεια and νόσος). The analogy established in the Gorgias between bodily health and a good 
condition of the soul finds its sense within the framework of an attempt to illustrate the distinction 
between mere persuasion, being produced by rhetoric (a sheer flattery [κολακεία] disguised as 
craft), and authentic goodness and happiness, being the outcome of real justice (i.e. a real craft). 
Socrates proposes a classification of authentic crafts by comparing a broad expertise dealing with 
the soul, i.e. the political craft with a corresponding (unnamed) art dealing with bodily health. 
One of the fields into which politics can be subdivided is the art of legislation, which sets the 
conditions for good practice and the promotion of goodness in the soul. A second subdivision of 
political expertise is justice (δικαιοσύνη), which corrects and attempts to preserve the works of 
legislation. Correspondingly, the art dealing with bodily health can be subdivided into gymnastic, 
which endorses the discipline and good habits leading to bodily health, and medical craft (ἡ 
ἰατρική), which deals with bodies whose health is undermined or heavily compromised (Gorg. 
464b3-7). Noticeably, the medical craft is distinguished from ὀψοποιική, cookery, i.e. a flattery 
disguised as medicine (Gorg. 463b1-3). Correspondingly, the true good that the medical craft 
deals with, health, will differ from a condition of apparent goodness, grounded in pleasantness 
but not in the order of the body.  
57 As Socrates explains at Gorg. 503e1-504a5, the medical craft, which promotes authentic health, 
brings regularity (τάξις) and order (κόσμος) into the body, and it does so according to the same 
principle followed by an artist (δημιουργός), who disposes everything according to a certain 
order, and causes one part to suit and to fit with another, to the effect of making the whole a 
regular and well-ordered work.  
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Interestingly enough, in the conclusive phase of the Socratic argument, the analogy 
between health and justice leaves room for a proper metaphor, through which virtue is 
taken to be not simply “similar” to health, but as “a form of health”: 
[V]irtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, 
and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness.” 
ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ 
κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια. 
 
This is not the place for an extensive analysis of the notion of health and its role 
in Plato’s elaboration of virtue and justice. For the aims of the present work, suffice it to 
establish that, for Plato, health is an optimal (either physical or moral) condition, and not 
simply one of “absence of sickness”, as instead Simonides seems to regard it. Similarly, 
beauty in the passage above appears as a condition which, being associated to virtue and 
a good condition of the soul, cannot represent the qualifying trait of a minimal level of 
morality, as Simonides instead suggests when he claims that beautiful is simply whatever 
has no admixture of what is ugly. Unlike the Platonic Socrates, who contends that it is the 
presence of the beautiful that makes something beautiful, Simonides believes that beauty 
is the result of simple absence of evil (see the sentence “all things are fair, [the things] 
with which ugly things are not mixed” at vv. 31-32).58 It is therefore understandable why 
the Platonic Socrates, commenting on Simonides’ view of beauty, points out that  
[H]e is not saying this as if he were saying that all things are white in which no black is mixed 
in—you see, this would be laughable for lots of reasons; but [he is saying] that he himself accepts 
the [things that are] in between [τὰ μέσα] so as not to blame [them] (Prot. 346d1-4). 
From Socrates’ point of view, the Simonidean “healthy” and “beautiful” things 
can ideally be situated in a space in-between perfect goodness and absolute evil. As the 
passage above implies, Socrates believes that the absence of sickness and ugliness cannot 
be used as definitory properties of goodness. If he did so, he would probably be ridiculed 
as the one who defined the white as the thing which contains no black. Indeed, as Socrates 
suggests, the essence of moral goodness cannot be identified with the absence of the 
things that goodness itself is not supposed to contain. What is more, in the light of perfect 
                                                          
58 See Barrus and Arieti 2010, Appendix C, p. 121. 
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goodness, actions or persons lacking outstandingness59 would appear unworthy of praise. 
This is why the things “in-between” absolute virtue and absolute vice might be viewed 
not only as “intermediate” between goodness and evil, but also as the expression of a 
failure at achieving perfect goodness – a failure which, for Socrates, would justifiably 
rule out praise.  
To my understanding, both approaches on virtue – namely the Simonidean and 
the Socratic ones – reflect a distinctively archaic way of presenting concepts, that is, one 
rooted in the the logic of “polarized opposites”.60 In the case of Simonides, the image of 
the healthy person, being alien from vice and unlawfulness, can be outlined in opposition 
to the image of a person lacking a minimal level of respect for laws, one which does not 
refrain from accomplishing bad deeds. It is a similar opposition which allows Simonides 
to qualify the healthy person as properly virtuous, although not in the highest and most 
complete sense. By contrast, in Socrates’ cricitism of Simonides, two oppositions seem 
to stand out: (1) the one between the absolutely good and the absolutely bad; (2) the one 
of mere absence of evil intentions and the absolutely good.61 If, in the light of opposition 
n. 1, Socrates is allowed to qualify the acts of the Simonidean healthy man as “τὰ μέσα”, 
in the light of opposition n. 2 enables him to reckon minimal goodness as unworthy of 
praise. In other words, the Simonidean notion of “health”, being compared by Socrates 
with absolute perfection, might evoke a condition of despicable “not-outstandingness”.  
As I believe, by so interpreting Simonides, the Platonic Socrates might also want 
to offer a clarification of a Simonidean positions that close to one which Protagoras 
expresses at Prot. 326d1-e4. One of these views consists in the idea that a person who, to 
Socrates’ eyes, would appear as profoundly unjust might instead be viewed as good if 
compared to persons totally deprived of education and laws. Protagoras conveys this 
                                                          
59 The negative connotation of “things that are in between” (τὰ μέσα) is stressed in both Lamb’s 
and Reale’s translation.  
60 See the comment of Arieti and Barrus, p. 121: «the Greeks of Simonides’ and Parmenides’ 
generation, says Fränkel (Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 311), had a logic of polarized 
thought. Today we think of degrees of brightness; for the archaic Greeks, something moderately 
bright would have been a mixture of extreme opposites, so that a moderately bright day would 
have been composed of a mixture of total brightness and total darkness. By the same logic, if one 
quality is lacking, the opposite is wholly present. For Simonides, therefore, that which contains 
no mixture of the ugly is wholly beautiful. The idea, then, is this: it is not just the presence of the 
beautiful that makes someting fair, but the absence of evil». 
61 See Arieti and Barrus 2010, p. 121.  
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message by means of an analogy between a flute player and a man living in the polis. In 
the attempt to show that we ought not to expect the sons of virtuous politicians to become 
more virtuous in political matters than other young people, he says:  
that the sons of good flute players would become good flute players any the more than [the sons 
of] inconsequential [flute players]? I think not, but anyone’s son, having been born excellent-by-
nature in flute music, could become big and famous, and anyone’s son who lacked natural 
[excellence] would be without fame. And often [the son of] a good flute player would prove to be 
an inconsequential [flute player] and the [son of an inconsequential flute player would prove] a 
good one. But however that might be, in fact, all [these] flute players would be adequate compared 
to laymen knowing nothing of the flute. And in this way, think even now that anyone reared 
among conventions and human beings who seems to you to be a very unjust human being is 
[nevertheless] himself just, even a craftsman of this, if he should need to be judged in comparison 
with human beings who have neither education nor law courts nor conventions nor any necessity 
continually necessitating anyone to take care for excellence, but are wild… (Prot. 327b3-d4). 
As we see in the passage above, Protagoras not only justifies the idea that even 
persons lacking civic excellence can somehow be regarded as just, but he also refers to 
Socrates’ assessment of that idea as an evaluation which appears based on a pure opinion. 
The sophist62, who is well known for his defense of what has been interpreted by Plato 
and Aristotle as an identity between truth and appearance63, opposes what “is” really just 
(his idea of the non-excellent man; “δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι”) to what merely “appears” to 
Socrates (“ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος”) to be deeply unjust.  
It is possible that, by introducing Simonides’ poem and his defense of the healthy 
man, the Platonic Socrates means to provide a restatement of Protagoras’ position on 
imperfect virtue and to give higher emphasis to a standpoint which he starkly opposes: 
namely, the idea that sheer respect of justice might be qualified as a form of virtuous 
behaviour. That point of view will be challenged by Socrates in the following pages of 
the Protagoras, where he will try to show that each virtue can be understood as a form of 
science (Prot. 360e7-361c2). 
                                                          
62 At Prot. 348e3, Socrates says that Protagoras had publicly proclaimed himself to all the Greeks 
as a sophist, unlike others who make a secret of that art. At Prot. 319a1-8 Protagoras confirms to 
be a teacher of political science, and proclaims his commitment to making men good citizens.  
63 See for instance Aristotle, Metaph. K, 6.1062b12-19, who interprets the Protagorean 
pronouncement “Man is the measure” (ἄνθρωπος μέτρον) concept of the “man measure” as 
entailing that what appears to each person also is with absolute certitude. Cf. Metaph. Γ, 
5.1009a6. See also The Theaetetus of Plato, where Socrates places in the mouth of Protagoras the 
claim that: «each of us is the measure of the things that are and those that are not; but each person 
differs immeasurably from every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, 
and to another person other things» (Theaet. 166d2-7 ff.; tr. Fowler 1921). 
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Conclusions 
 
It is now time to draw some conclusive remarks out of the picture sketched so far. 
In the Ode to Scopas, Simonides seems to defend a lifestyle which is presumably the same 
embraced by the tyrant Scopas. This leads Simonides to express his personal praise on an 
ideal of imperfect moral goodness, which is to say, one which departs from the perfect 
virtue of the man square (τετράγωνος) in hands and feet and mind. The illustration of the 
positive aspects of imperfect moral goodness is premised on the thought that extremely 
hard efforts are needed to acquire perfect virtue in absolute. Most crucially, such efforts 
prove themselves to be vain if we consider, as Simonides does, that a severely bad luck 
inevitably ends up affecting the moral outlook of perfectly virtuous people. It is worth 
noting that Simonides does not mention the possibility that a heavily bad luck never 
occurs across the human lifespan, to the effect that perfect virtue can be stably preserved. 
Similarly, he avoids examining the possibility that even an imperfect moral virtue, like 
perfect goodness, might be amenable to the strikes of bad luck. Those omissions might 
suggest that the poet means to shift attention to the desirability of an imperfect, less 
demanding condition of moral goodness, and also that he does so by way of arguments 
which the Platonic Socrates himself might view as “sophistic”. It ought to be noticed, 
however, that the rigour required of a proper philosophical analysis is missing also in the 
exegesis of the poem undertaken by the Platonic Socrates in the Protagoras. His 
professed activity of “correction”, just by being a rectification of the poem’s content, 
purposedly fails to restore the original meaning and intentions of the poem.  
I have argued that, despite the lack of exegetic rigour, Socrates’ attempts are not 
simply meant to mock a distinctively sophistic attitude towards the interpretation of 
poetry, but they might help Simonides’ readers to bring out authentically Simonidean 
concepts. As we have seen, although Socrates departs from Simonides when he claims 
that being permanently virtuous is an easy task, the distinction between “being” and 
“becoming” (perfectly) virtuous which Socrates ascribes to Simonides might be truly 
employed by the poet to show that achieving perfect virtue involves efforts is difficult, 
whereas being stably virtuous is impossible. A second aspect that Socrates seems to 
rightly emphasise is the idea that sheer avoidance of ugly acts is for Simonides a sufficient 
condition to qualify an agent as morally good, although in an imperfect sense. Unlike the 
absolute virtue displayed by the “square” man, the virtue the human type that Simonides 
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describes as “healthy” denotes a minimal condition of moral decency, one which is to be 
praised simply on the ground that whoever possesses that moral capacity refrains from 
injustice and harm against other fellow-humans. I have also suggested that Simonides’ 
appeal to the notion of health in a moral sense might evoke the idea of “absence of 
outstandingness”, which the “square” man instead embodies. The Simonidean idea of 
health is starkly opposed to the Socratic-Platonic one, which denotes only a condition of 
perfect goodness. As is shown by the discussions undertaken by Socrates with his 
interlocutors, the idea that fair are those things with which ugly things are not mixed is to 
be rectified. It might be said, however, that Socrates’s exegesis might not be exclusively 
confined to pave the way for criticism of Simonides’ views. His hermeneutical attempt 
might help the reader to bring out a doublefold anthropological picture of goodness, one 
in which the ideal of perfect virtue, although professedly noble and possible to achieve, 
is less practicable than the one embodied by the simply “healthy” one and justifies a 
departure in expectations. That view, once understood by the Platonic Socrates, might 
compel him to face the challenge of underlying the risks that might be present in 
downplaying the consequences of lack of perfect virtue in the democratic life.  
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